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Accrual and Real-based Earnings Management by UK Acquirers:  
Evidence from Pre- and Post-Higgs Periods 
 
Abstract 
Purpose: This study investigates the occurrence of pre-merger earnings management for 
a sample of 197 stock- and cash-financed UK acquirers between 1990 and 2009. We also 
examine the earnings management behavior around the change in the Corporate 
Governance Code in 2003 based on the Higgs recommendations. 
Methodology: Mean and median accrual and real-based manipulation are examined in 
the period before the announcement of a merger and acquisition. These are compared 
across stock and cash acquirers as well as before and after the implementation of the 
Higgs recommendations. We also run logistic regressions to examine accrual and real-
based manipulation across stock and cash acquirers after controlling for variables that 
may impact the acquisition type. 
Findings: We find some evidence of upward pre-merger accrual-based earnings 
management by stock-financed acquirers, which is in line with the findings of Botsari and 
Meeks (2008). Furthermore, we do not find significant changes in the post-Higgs period 
which indicates that the recommendations put forth by Higgs may not have been 
successful in mitigating earnings management. Our evidence also shows that cash bidders 
engage in pre-merger real earnings manipulation through lower discretionary expenses, 
possibly to enhance cash availability for the bid.  
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Practical implications: The findings in this study confirm earnings management exists 
around mergers and acquisitions and provide some evidence that the recommendations 
set out in the Higgs Report do not appear to have mitigated earnings management 
activities. This is of interest to regulators as well as investors and academicians. 
Originality: This provides the first analysis in the UK examining the use of real-based 
earnings management activities by UK acquirers. It also extends prior research around 
corporate governance changes that occurred in the UK. 
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MEL Classification: M41, M48 
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1. Introduction 
Earnings management has been extensively examined through a stream of research that 
considers firms involved in specific corporate events (such as seasoned equity offerings, 
initial public offerings and management buyouts). This study extends prior results on 
earnings management in mergers and acquisitions (hereafter M&As) that engage in either 
cash or stock bids; and examines the prevalence of accrual and real-based earnings 
management in this context. Furthermore, we examine whether regulatory changes in the 
UK following the Higgs (2003) report have an impact on earnings management in this 
context. 
Though prior research has examined accrual-based manipulation in the M&A context in 
the US (such as Erickson and Wang, 1999; Louis, 2004) in the UK (Botsari and Meeks, 
2008), and in the Asia-pacific region (Ardekani et al., 2012; Higgins, 2013; Jeong and 
Bae, 2013), only limited studies have extended its scope to examine whether acquiring 
firms engage in the manipulation of real activities (e.g. Zhang, 2015). Therefore, a 
comprehensive study that considers both accrual and real-based earnings management 
practices is needed to contribute to earnings management research in the UK M&A 
context. 
Furthermore, fundamental changes to governance codes around the world have occurred 
over the past few years. For example, the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US; 
the UK Corporate Governance Code in the UK based on the recommendations set out in 
the Higgs Report (2003), among others; and the governance reforms in Australia, through 
the ‘Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations’ (ASX, 2003, 2007, and 
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2014). However, the effectiveness of those changes has not been empirically tested in the 
M&A setting. The crucial role of the Higgs Report (2003) in improving the Corporate 
Governance Code in the UK provides the motivation to investigate the prevalence of both 
accrual and real-based earnings management activities in the period prior to and 
following the issuance of this report. Support for this analysis is driven by research that 
indicates the impact of governance characteristics and institutional settings on earnings 
management behavior (e.g. Koh, 2003; Reverte, 2008; Epps and Ismail, 2009; Kent et al., 
2010; Bhuiyan et al., 2013) as well as recent contributions to the UK literature that 
document the important effect of some corporate governance mechanisms raised by the 
Higgs Report (2003) in reducing earnings management activities (Iqbal and Strong, 2010; 
Habbash et al., 2013a; 2013b).  
The findings of the current study show some evidence of income-increasing pre-merger 
accrual-based earnings management by stock-financed acquirers in the full sample of 
years 1990-2009. However, there does not appear to be any changes across periods before 
and after the enactment of the Higgs recommendations. Furthermore, there is no evidence 
of manipulation by stock bidders using real activities either before or after the enactment 
of the Higgs recommendations, which indicate that M&As may not have shifted from 
accrual to real manipulation as is the case in different settings in the US. 
On the other hand, cash bidders engage in pre-merger real earnings manipulation through 
mainly lower discretionary expenses, possibly to enhance cash availability for the bid.  
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When comparing stock and cash bidders, we find that stock bidders engage in income-
increasing accrual manipulation more than cash bidders but mostly in the pre-Higgs 
period. 
This study contributes to the literature in two ways. Firstly, we provide the first analysis 
of the use of real-based earnings management by UK acquirers following the US 
empirical methodology (Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Zang, 2012). 
Furthermore, we hypothesize and find different results for M&As financed by cash as 
well as stock. Secondly, this study conducts the first analysis of the effect of the Higgs 
Report in the M&A setting, by comparing the magnitude of pre-merger accrual and real-
based earnings management activities in pre- and post-Higgs periods.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the prior studies in 
the M&A setting as well as those related to accrual and real-based earnings management 
especially in this setting. Building on the theoretical and empirical support of the 
literature, several hypotheses are developed. Section 3 discusses the empirical 
methodology including the sample selection and earnings management measures. Section 
4 presents and discusses the empirical results. The last section concludes the paper. 
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2. Related literature and hypotheses development 
Historically, M&As in the UK have been prevalent and have tended to occur in cycles 
(Resende, 1999, 2008; Kastrinaki and Stoneman, 2013). Kastrinaki and Stoneman (2013) 
find evidence of long regular cycles in aggregate merger activities over the period 1969-
2005 with each cycle lasting 6 years. They show that these cycles of M&A activities are 
caused by economic factors such as fluctuations in stock prices, interest rates and GDP 
growth (Kastrinaki and Stoneman, 2013). In essence, M&As are carried out by 
companies to achieve certain strategic and financial objectives that include: market 
position improvement, geographic expansion, diversification and/or technological 
enhancement (Sudarsanam, 1995; Thompson et al., 2004). Other motivations include 
disciplinary as well as undervaluation reasons (Raj and Forsyth, 2004). 
Studies on M&As in the UK tend to examine the effectiveness and the impact of these 
activities in certain sectors such as in hospitals (e.g. Haigh, 2000; Cereste et al., 2003; 
Gaynor et al., 2012) and in banks (e.g. Barnes, 1985; Haynes and Thompson, 1999; 
Saunders and Wilson, 1999; Piskula, 2011). However, results from these studies cannot 
be easily generalized to other sectors. 
Studies in the UK that cover economy-wide M&A activities tend to focus on post-merger 
accounting returns (profitability) or short- and long-term effects on shareholder wealth of 
the acquirer or the target firm with mixed results. For example, some studies find that the 
profitability of UK acquiring firms consistently declines in post-merger years (Meeks, 
1977; Dickerson et al., 1997; Kumar, 1984). Other studies find post-merger increase in 
profitability in certain instances (Chatterjee and Meeks, 1996; Guest et al., 2010). 
 7 
 
Furthermore, some studies find a negative impact on share returns for the acquirer firm 
(Barnes, 1984; Franks and Harris, 1989; Conn et al., 2005) whereas others find a positive 
impact (Hodgkinson and Partington, 2008).  
The mode of payment of the acquisitions is also an important consideration. Previous US 
and UK literature (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003; Dong 
et al., 2006; Akbulut, 2013)  document negative announcement returns earned by 
acquiring firms who use stock as a mode of payment and these equity-financed bids 
substantially underperform cash-financed ones. This is consistent with potential 
overvaluation of acquirers’ stock which is not fully corrected on the announcement date, 
but rather destroys shareholder value both in the short and long run.  
However, few studies have focused on examining accounting irregularities in acquirers 
prior to an M&A announcement which can potentially explain mixed evidence of 
shareholder returns around M&As. An acquirer’s motivation to manage earnings depends 
on the use of equity as a mode of payment because the market value of a share is affected 
by earnings management. The target’s shareholders are concerned with the fair value of 
the acquirer’s share, only if they have an ownership interest in the combined firm in 
exchange for their old shares. The following sections present current literature in this area 
conducted in other countries and propose the hypotheses for the current study.  
2.1 Accrual-based earnings management in M&As 
Several studies have examined the occurrence of earnings management around major 
events in corporate finance. These events include seasoned equity offerings (e.g. Rangan, 
1998; Teoh et al., 1998b; Shivakumar, 2000; Ching et al., 2006; Iqbal et al., 2009; 
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Bardos and Zaiats, 2012; Dionysiou, 2015), initial public offerings (e.g., Teoh et al., 
1998a; Teoh et al., 1998c; Teoh and Wong, 2002; Chang et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2014; 
Miloud, 2014), and management buyouts (e.g. DeAngelo, 1986; Perry and Williams, 
1994).  
In the M&A setting, it is expected that acquirers who engage in stock swaps have a 
particular incentive to manage earnings upward before making a bid, in order to look 
more attractive to the target’s shareholders and to improve their chance of successfully 
completing the bid (Erikson and Wang, 1999; Botsari and Meeks, 2008). The effect of 
earnings management on M&As was first empirically investigated by Erickson and Wang 
(1999). Using a sample of 55 US acquirers completing stock-for-stock mergers from 
1985 till 1990, they find that stock-financed bidders manage earnings upward in the 
quarter immediately preceding the announcement date of the stock swap acquisition. 
They also report that cash acquirers do not reveal significant levels of abnormal accruals 
during the pre-merger periods. Louis (2004) also finds that discretionary current accruals 
are positive and statistically significant for acquiring firms who engage in stock swaps 
especially in the quarter immediately preceding the deal’s announcement. Using a sample 
of 609 mergers of publicly traded targets and 898 mergers of privately held targets 
between 1990 and 1998, Baik et al. (2007) provide additional evidence that US acquirers 
are more likely to manage accrual-based earnings upward when they use stock to acquire 
a privately held target.They argue that bidders have greater incentives to manage earnings 
prior to their acquisition if the respective target was privately held in order to compensate 
for the relatively higher level of information asymmetry.  
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Consistent with previous US studies, Botsari and Meeks (2008) find significant evidence 
of pre-merger earnings management for bidders who engage in stock-financed bids in the 
UK. The study covers a sample of 42 UK publicly traded acquiring firms, over the period 
1997-2001, that used their shares in the deal’s payment structure offered to the respective 
target firms. They document strong evidence suggesting that acquiring firms engage in 
income-increasing accrual manipulation in the year immediately preceding the bid 
announcement.  
In other regions, mixed results are found. For example, Koumanakos et al. (2005) 
examine a sample of 42 acquiring firms that successfully completed their bids in Greece 
during the period 2001-2003 and find positive, albeit weak, evidence of accounting 
earnings manipulation in the year prior to the announcement and the completion of the 
bid. Ardekani et al. (2012) find, in a sample of Malaysian firms during 2004-2010, 
evidence of upward earnings manipulation for stock acquirers but not for cash acquirers.  
Higgins (2013), using a sample of 133 Japanese stock-for-stock acquirers during 1990–
2004, documents evidence that acquiring firms manage earnings upward in the year 
preceding the bid announcement. Limited evidence also exists, in Australian M&As 
during the period 1986-1991, that the target company engages in earnings manipulation 
following the bid announcement (Eddey and Taylor, 1999). Ben-Amar and Missionier-
Piera (2008) on the other hand, find that managers of friendly takeover targets in 
Switzerland manage earnings downwards in the year prior to the event. Jeong and Bae 
(2013), in the Korean context, also find evidence of acquiring firms managing pre-merger 
earnings downwards, when the stock-for-stock merger is between firms in the same 
business group.  
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Given the motivation of the acquirers to manage earnings upward prior to M&A deals 
and the supported empirical literature, we begin by replicating prior results in our sample 
and examine the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1a: Successful stock bidders engage in positive accrual-based earnings 
management in the accounting year prior to a bid announcement. 
Several studies (such as Travlos, 1987; Loughran and Vijh, 1997; Linn and Switzer, 
2001; Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003; Moeller et al., 2004; Dong et al., 2005; and others) 
find that acquirers experience negative stock returns around the announcement of stock-
financed acquisitions but not cash-financed acquisitions. This could indicate that the 
announcement of cash acquisitions reveal more favourable information than the 
announcement of stock acquisitions and hence there is less incentives for cash bidders 
than stock ones to manage earnings. Also, from the accounting perspective of window 
dressing, it could be argued that acquirers who engage in stock swaps have more 
incentives than cash acquirers to manage their earnings upward before the merger takes 
place in order to look more attractive to the target’s shareholders and receive their 
approval.  In this regard, the motivation of cash acquirers to manage earnings is limited 
because it will be a costly process that carries no economic return. Moreover, acquirer's 
shareholders retain the same level of control over their company in using cash versus 
stock as a mode of payment. Hence, there is no dilution of management control 
associated with cash acquisitions and any attempt to manage accrual and/or real-based 
earnings should have no effect on the purchase deal. Therefore, we expect the following 
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regarding earnings management practices in stock bidders when compared to cash 
bidders.   
Hypothesis 1b: Successful stock bidders engage in more positive accrual-based earnings 
management in the accounting year prior to a bid announcement compared to cash 
bidders. 
2.2 Real-based earnings management 
Although most of the research in earnings management has focused on accrual based 
earnings management, recent literature investigates the use of real activities in 
manipulating earnings. A US-based survey of top executives finds that managers prefer 
real earnings management activities to manipulation of accruals (Graham et al., 2005). 
They provide strong evidence that managers engage in real economic actions, which 
include price discounts to temporarily increase sales, excessive inventory production to 
lower the cost of goods sold, and aggressive reduction in discretionary expenditures such 
as research and development (R&D) expenses to improve profit margins (Graham et al., 
2005). Prior research examine one particular real account manipulation method such as 
the reduction of R&D expenditures (Baber et al. 1991; Bushee 1998); while others 
examine all three manipulation methods around a threshold such as zero earnings 
(Roychowdhury 2006). 
Cohen and Zarowin (2010) examine both accrual and real-based earnings management 
behavior around seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) for a sample of 1,511 completed US 
offers from 1987 to 2006. They find that US firms engage in income-increasing accrual 
manipulation, as well as real-based earnings management activities around SEOs, and 
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that managers trade-off these two activities. Ibrahim et al. (2011) examine a sample of 
1,871 SEO firms between 1990 and 2004 and find that SEO firms engage in income-
increasing accrual and real account manipulation in the year prior to the offering. Zang 
(2012) investigates whether managers make accrual and real earnings manipulation 
simultaneously or sequentially. The author provides empirical evidence that accrual and 
real earnings management practices are implemented sequentially, with real earnings 
manipulation decisions preceding earnings management via accruals (Zang, 2012). 
Dionysiou (2015) examines both accrual and real accounts manipulation in a sample of 
UK pure placements (where pre-emptive rights of existing shareholders in secondary 
equity offerings are waived) and does not find evidence of either. In the M&A setting, 
only limited research has examined the use of real manipulation around mergers. For 
example, Zhang (2015) finds, in a sample of Chinese acquisitions during the period 2008-
2010, that acquirers using stock-for-stock exchanges exhibit significant negative 
abnormal cash flows and discretionary expenses prior to the merger, which provide 
evidence of upward real earnings manipulation.  
Building on the empirical evidence of the existence of real earnings management 
activities to manage earnings, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
Hypothesis 2a: Successful stock bidders engage in positive real-based earnings 
management in the accounting year prior to a bid announcement. 
Hypothesis 2b: Successful stock bidders engage in more positive real-based earnings 
management in the accounting year prior to a bid announcement compared to cash 
bidders. 
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2.3 Higgs Report (2003) and earnings management 
Given that accounting research should be closely tied to practice, prior research finds that 
a significant area of research impact in different settings is regulatory policy (Benson et 
al., 2014). Therefore, it is important to examine how regulation might impact the 
behavior of firms around M&As. In the context of earnings manipulation, a growing 
consideration in the literature has been given to the important role of different corporate 
governance mechanisms and practices in monitoring managers’ discretion and in limiting 
their abilities to manipulate earnings (Dechow et al., 1996; Peasnell et al., 2000a, 2000b; 
Xie et al., 2003; Davidson et al., 2005; Peasnell et al., 2005; Habbash et al., 2013a). For 
example, in the US, regulatory changes through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 which 
strengthened governance mechanisms have led to a reduction in accrual earnings 
management in different contexts (Cohen et al., 2008; Li et al., 2008; Chen and Huang, 
2013). Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) show analytically that earnings quality increases 
with tighter standards. However, managers increase costly real-based manipulation.  
Recent governance reforms in Australia, through the ‘Corporate Governance Principles 
and Recommendations’ (ASX, 2003, 2007, and 2009) targeted areas that would improve 
monitoring such as establishing a corporate governance committee. Evidence points to 
those reforms being associated with reduced earnings management (Liu, 2012). 
Moreover, based on 70 New Zealand listed companies over the period of 2000-2007, 
Bhuiyam et al. (2013) provide evidence that better compliance with corporate governance 
mechanisms is related to lower managerial discretionary accruals. Other research 
examines how particular governance attributes impact earnings management. For 
example, Davidson et al. (2005) find, in a sample of Australian firms in 2000, that a 
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majority of non-executive directors on the board and on the audit committee are 
associated with a lower likelihood of earnings management.  Moreover, through an 
Australian study of listed companies, Baxter and Cotter (2009) find that audit committees 
are associated with lower intentional earnings management activities. Chen et al. (2007) 
find that corporate governance characteristics (independence of supervisors, financial 
expertise of independent directors, and voluntary formation of independent directorships) 
reduce the likelihood of earnings management for companies listed in Taiwan. This 
relation was stronger after the enactment of the Corporate Governance Best-Practice 
Principles (CGBPP) in Taiwan. Similarly, Kasipillai and Mahenthiran (2013), through a 
sample of 221 Malaysian public listed companies (PLCs) from 2005 to 2008, find that 
corporate governance mechanisms (ownership structure and board structure) reduce 
earnings management activities. 
Recent UK studies by Iqbal and Strong (2010) and Habbash et al. (2013a; 2013b) shed 
light on the crucial role and impact of the recent corporate governance recommendations 
and reforms on enhancing the reporting quality in the UK in general and constraining 
earnings management activities in particular. The Higgs Report on the Corporate 
Governance Code (2003) stresses the importance of corporate governance mechanisms in 
enhancing the quality of accounting information. In addition to its recommendations that 
at least half of the board members should be independent non-executive directors, the 
Higgs Report (2003) stresses that one of the responsibilities of non-executive directors is 
to assure themselves about the integrity of financial information through enforcing 
financial control mechanisms and systems of risk management. In this regards, recent UK 
studies support these recommendations by stressing the important role of non-executive 
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directors in reducing earnings management activities (Iqbal and Strong, 2010; Habbash et 
al., 2013a).  
To the extent that the Higgs Report (2003) has had a major role in strengthening the 
Corporate Governance Code in UK, it is of interest to investigate the prevalence of both 
accrual and real-based earnings management activities in the period leading to and 
following the implementation of Higgs recommendations. In this regard, the primary 
objective in examining changes in firms’ earnings management practices is to investigate 
whether the passage of the report resulted in constraining such manipulation. We 
formulate the following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 3a: The magnitude of positive accrual-based earnings management by 
successful stock bidders is lower in the post-Higgs period than in the pre-Higgs one. 
Hypothesis 3b: The magnitude of positive accrual-based earnings management by 
successful stock bidders compared to cash bidders is lower in the post-Higgs period than 
in the pre-Higgs one. 
Cohen et al. (2008) find that the period prior to the passage of SOX in 2002 was 
characterised by higher levels of accrual-based earnings management activities and lower 
levels of real-based activities. On the other hand, they document that following the 
implementation of SOX, accrual-based earnings management practices decreased 
significantly while real-based manipulation increased significantly. Cohen et al. (2008) 
and Graham et al. (2005) attribute this shift in earnings manipulation between accrual and 
real-based activities before and after the SOX Act to the crucial role of auditors or 
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regulators in scrutinising accrual manipulations rather than real ones after the passage of 
SOX Act. 
In line with this, Ibrahim et al. (2011) find that the enactment of SOX has an impact in 
reducing accrual-based earnings management activities in the SEO setting. They stress 
the substitution effect between accrual- and real-based manipulations. Zang (2012) 
provides empirical evidence confirming that managers use these two forms of 
manipulation as substitutes. Based on this US evidence, we examine whether the level of 
real earnings management activities increased after Higgs and whether firms switched 
from accrual earnings management to real-based manipulation. The following hypotheses 
are formulated: 
Hypothesis 4a: The magnitude of positive real-based earnings management by successful 
stock bidders is higher in the post-Higgs period than in the pre-Higgs one. 
Hypothesis 4b: The magnitude of positive real-based earnings management by 
successful stock bidders compared to cash bidders is higher in the post-Higgs period than 
in the pre-Higgs one. 
3. Sample and methodology 
3.1 Data and sample selection  
The sample in this study includes M&As announced by UK companies in the twenty year 
period from 1 January, 1990 till 31 December, 2009. The period is particularly interesting 
because in the 1990s the UK experienced the fourth M&A wave. Furthermore, during this 
period there were major changes in the corporate governance arrangements starting with 
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the enforcement of Cadbury Report in 1992 and the revision of the UK Corporate 
Governance Code introduced in July 2003 following the recommendations raised in the 
Higgs and Smith reports.  
To be included in the final sample, each deal has to meet the following criteria: 
1. The deal was successfully completed between UK acquirers and domestic targets. 
2. Acquirers and targets must be publicly listed companies and traded on the London 
Stock Exchange (LSE) for two reasons: The first reason is that both acquirers and 
targets are subject to same issuances of laws and regulations such as the 
recommendations raised by Higgs Report (2003). The second reason is to 
minimize the differences in the level of information asymmetry between the 
bidder and the target. 
3. The deal is financed either by using pure cash or by offering shares to the target 
firm.1 
4. Acquirers and targets belong to an industry other than the banking and financial 
industry since they are subject to specific accounting requirements which may 
differ substantially from other sectors.  
5. The acquirer has the necessary financial data on Datastream to estimate the annual 
proxies for both accrual and real-based earnings management in the period prior 
to the announcement deal. 
                                                          
1 We include only acquisitions that use one financing method for clearer results. However, in un-tabulated 
results, we also examine acquisitions financed by a combination of cash and stock and find no significant 
manipulation in this sample. 
 18 
 
To account for confounding multiple transactions, we require that acquisitions by the 
same firm not be in adjacent fiscal periods. We first examine all acquisitions and 
determine the fiscal period in which they were announced. In order to limit mis-
specification of the accrual and real manipulation measures in the year prior to the 
announcement, if an acquirer has two acquisitions in adjacent years, we keep only the 
first acquisition.2  
In addition to exclusion of observations due to unavailable data, a few observations are 
deleted to mitigate the effects of outliers. The mean plus/minus 3 Standard deviation rule 
is used to check the distribution of variables in the study and we exclude extreme values. 
The final sample consists of 197 firm observations of acquirers that meet the sampling 
criteria and have available data.  Sample data for the M&As were drawn from two main 
sources, namely Thomson One Banker and Datastream. The detailed sample selection 
procedure is illustrated in Table 1. In the final sample there are 23 firms with multiple 
acquisitions that span the sample period. Out of these, 21 firms have two acquisition 
deals that are not in adjacent years. The remaining 2 acquirers have three acquisition 
deals not in adjacent years.  
((Table1)) 
Table 2 reports the distribution of the final sample comprising of 197 bids. Panel A 
presents the distribution of the overall sample of acquirers by year for the full sample and 
by mode of payment. The sample distribution by year indicates that merger activities 
peaked at the end of the 1990s. From the entire sample, 75 bids are stock offers and the 
                                                          
2 Results when these multiple acquisitions are included in the final sample are qualitatively the same. 
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remaining are cash ones. Panel B of this table demonstrates how the sample is distributed 
across a total range of 12 industry sectors. These sectors are classified according to the 
Fama and French 12 industry classification using the 2-digit SIC codes. Sectors that are 
more representative than others in the sample are: manufacturing with 23 acquirers (11.68 
percent), healthcare with 19 acquirers (9.64 percent), business equipment with 17 
acquirers (8.63 percent) and wholesale and retail with 16 acquirers (8.12 percent). A 
comparison of cash and stock bids reveals differences across the healthcare industry (16 
percent of stock bids but only 5.74 percent of cash bids) as well as the energy sector (4 
percent of stock bids but only 0.82 percent of cash bids). 
((Table 2)) 
There are 131 bids that took place before the enactment of the Higgs Report (2003) 
(classified as years 1990-2002) in which 42 of them are stock offers and the remaining 
are cash ones. The period after the issuance of this report reveals that out of 66 bids, 33 
are stock offers and the rest are cash ones. 
3.2 Accrual-based earnings management measures 
Accrual-based earnings management is measured using both the discretionary current 
accruals and the discretionary total accruals based on the cross-sectional version of the 
modified Jones model (Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995) with modifications suggested 
by Kothari et al. (2005). We use current accruals as Botsari and Meeks (2008) and Louis 
(2004) note that in M&As and for valuing bidders and targets, investment bankers rely 
heavily on earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortisation (EBITDA). In 
this case, the bidder has greater incentives to manage current accruals. We also use total 
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accruals for robustness as this may indicate overinvestment activities and/or agency 
problems of the bidders; the difference between total accruals and current accruals comes 
from depreciation and amortization expense which is related to fixed assets and company 
size (Dionysiou, 2015). We use the cash flow approach in measuring current and total 
accruals given that the balance sheet approach can distort accruals especially around non-
articulation events such as M&As (Hribar & Collins, 2001). 
We measure earnings management in the year preceding the takeover as identified by the 
announcement date of the deal, as provided in the Thomson One Banker database, 
assuming that acquirers manage earnings before the announcement of a bid (DeFond and 
Park, 2001; Dechow et al., 2012; Higgins, 2013). The acquisition year (year t) and pre-
acquisition year (year t-1) are determined similar to Iqbal et al. (2009). As an example, if 
a firm has a December 31 year-end, we assume that accounting information for the 
financial year 2006 is available by March 31st, 2007. If the firm announces an acquisition 
between April 1st 2007 and March 31st, 2008, we use accounting information for 2006 as 
the data for the pre-acquisition year.  
Discretionary accruals are estimated in a two-step process. The first step involves the 
estimation of non-discretionary accruals based on the following cash-flow approach of 
the current accrual model: 
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Where: 
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CACij,t  is the current accruals for a firm i in industry group j for year t, measured as 
net income before extraordinary items less operating cash flow less depreciation and 
amortization; 
ΔREVij,t is the change in revenues for firm i in industry group j for year t; 
TAij,t-1  is total assets for firm i in industry group j for year t-1; 
ROAij,t  is return on assets for firm i in industry group j for year t; 
ԑij,t is the residual term for firm i in industry group j for year t. 
All variables in the above regression model, other than ROAij,t, are scaled by lagged total 
assets (
1, tijTA ) in order to reduce heteroskedasticity. The estimation of coefficients â0, â1, 
and â2 is done using all data from Datastream for all available firms and not only the 
sample M&A firms. The regressions are based on industry and year combination with 
industry classification based on the Fama and French 12 industry classification (FF12). 
The full set of observations in Datastream is used to ensure unbiased estimates for the 
above coefficients.  
The estimates of a0, a1, and a2 are used to calculate normal or non-discretionary current 
accruals (NCACij,t).
3  Abnormal current accruals (A_CAij,t) are then estimated as the 
difference between current accruals and normal or non-discretionary accruals. 
The following cross-sectional regression model is used to estimate the cash flow-based 
total discretionary accrual for each industry and year combination.  
                                                          
3 Change in accounts receivable is subtracted from change in revenue in the estimation of normal accruals 
to take into account any possible discretion arising from credit sales (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994). 
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Where:   
TACijt is total accruals for firm i in industry group j for year t, measured as net 
income before extraordinary items less operating cash flow; 
PPEij,t  is the gross property plant and equipment for firm i in industry group j for 
year t;  
All other variables are as previously defined. 
We use OLS regressions to estimate the above coefficients by each industry group and 
year to calculate normal or non-discretionary total accruals (NTACij,t). Then, the abnormal 
total accruals (A_TAij,t) represent the difference between the total accruals and the non-
discretionary or normal accruals. 
3.3 Real-based earning management measures 
According to prior US studies by Roychowdhury (2006), Cohen and Zarowin (2010), 
Ibrahim et al. (2011), and Zang (2012), real earnings management activities can be 
undertaken by the following three methods: 
1. Sales manipulation by accelerating the timing of sales through increasing price 
discounts or offering more lenient credit terms that will in turn temporarily increase 
sales levels.  
2. Discretionary expenditures manipulation by reducing advertising expenses, research 
and development (R&D) expenses and selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) 
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expenses. The reduction in these discretionary expenditures will boost current period 
earnings, especially if they do not generate immediate revenues and income. 
3. Production manipulation by overproducing goods to meet expected demand and boost 
earnings.  
Based on these manipulation methods, three proxies are derived to measure real earnings 
management activities: abnormal cash from operations (A_CFO), abnormal discretionary 
expenses (A_DISX) and abnormal production costs (A_PROD). To estimate the abnormal 
values of these proxies, the normal levels of cash from operations, discretionary 
expenses, and production costs are calculated by implementing the models developed by 
Dechow et al. (1998) and as followed in Roychowdhury (2006). Following Dechow et al. 
(1998), normal cash flow from operations are expressed as follows: 
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑗,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1
= a0
1
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1
+ a1
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑗,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1
+ a2
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑗,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1
+ εij,t 
Where:  
CFOij,t is operating cash flow for firm i in industry group j for year t; 
All other variables are as previously defined. 
The estimation of coefficients a0, a1, and a2, for each industry group is done in each year 
by following OLS regressions using the full data available in Datastream and these are 
used to calculate the normal level of CFO. Abnormal CFO (A_CFO) is the difference 
between actual CFO and the normal level of CFO. 
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Production costs are defined as the sum of cost of goods sold (COGS) and change in 
inventory during the year. Following Dechow et al. (1998), we estimate the normal level 
of production costs through the following industry-year regressions: 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑗,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1
= a0
1
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1
+ a1
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑗,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1
+ â2
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑗,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1
+ a3
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1
+ εij,t 
Where: 
 PRODi,j,t is the sum of the cost of goods sold and inventory change for firm i in 
industry j and year t;  
All other variables are as previously defined.  
Abnormal production costs (A_PROD) are computed as the difference between the actual 
value of the production costs and its normal level predicted from the estimated 
coefficients of the regression model. 
Similarly, following Roychowdhury (2006), normal discretionary expenses are measured 
through the following regression: 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑋𝑖𝑗,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1
= a0
1
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1
+ a1
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1
+ εij,t 
Where:  
DISXij,t is discretionary expenses for firm i in industry group j for year t; 
All other variables are as previously defined. 
Abnormal discretionary expenses (A_DISX) represent the difference between the 
discretionary expenses and their value at its normal level as predicted from the estimated 
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coefficients of the regression model. Discretionary expenses are defined as the sum of 
research and development (R&D) expenses and selling, general & administrative 
(SG&A) expenses. In calculating discretionary expenses, if SG&A is not missing but the 
R&D value is missing, then R&D is set to zero.  
For a given level of sales an upward manipulation in real-based earnings is detected, if 
firms have: unusually low cash flow from operations (i.e. negative abnormal CFO), 
and/or unusually low discretionary expenditures (i.e. negative abnormal discretionary 
expenses), and/or unusually high production costs (i.e. positive abnormal production 
costs). 
Table 3 presents correlation coefficients between all above accrual and real manipulation 
measures. As can be seen, A_CA and A_TA are highly correlated (coefficient = 0.893; 
significant at the 1% level). The highest correlation between accrual and real-based 
manipulation measures is between A_CA and A_CFO (coefficient = -0.521; significant at 
the 1% level). As can be seen there is a negative correlation between both accrual 
manipulation measures and A_CFO as well as A_DISX given that the first has an income-
increasing effect while the latter two have an income-decreasing effect. Furthermore, 
there is a positive correlation between both accrual manipulation measures and A_PROD 
as both indicate income-increasing behavior. 
((Table 3)) 
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4. Empirical results 
4.1 Accrual-based earnings management prior to merger announcements 
Table 4 presents the mean and median values for both current and total accruals in the 
overall sample and for stock and cash bidders, separately.  The mean abnormal working 
capital accruals of 0.019 and the median estimate of 0.018 in Table 4 are both statistically 
different from zero for the entire sample. When the sample is divided into stock and cash 
bids, different results between these two groups are observed. The mean and median 
abnormal current accrual for bidders engaging in stock swaps are 0.031 (significant at the 
10% level) and 0.039 (significant at the 1% level), respectively. These results support the 
first proposed hypothesis (1a) in this study and are consistent with Louis (2004) and 
Botsari and Meeks (2008). For instance, Botsari and Meeks (2008) find that the median 
discretionary accruals is 0.03 and statistically significant at the 5% level. Under the total 
accrual measure, discretionary accruals for stock bids are again positive, but are not 
statistically significant, except for the median. 
When comparing stock and cash bids, we find that the median differences (using the 
Wilcoxon Rank Sum test) for current and total abnormal accruals are 0.039 and 0.031 
(both significant at the 5% level) respectively. This indicates that the stock-financed 
acquirers have significantly higher abnormal accruals than the cash-financed acquirers, in 
support of hypothesis 1b.  These findings are consistent with those reported in Erickson 
and Wang (1999), Louis (2004), and Botsari and Meeks (2008) who find that stock 
bidders have significantly higher abnormal accruals than cash ones. 
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((Table 4)) 
4.2 Real-based earnings management prior to merger announcements  
Results in Table 5 provide the mean and median estimates of the three measures: A_CFO, 
A_DISX, and A_PROD in the year preceding the announcement date for the entire sample 
and for cash and stock bids, separately. As discussed in the previous section, a negative 
A_CFO and A_DISX, and a positive A_PROD all indicate positive earnings manipulation. 
The mean and median values for the three real-based earnings management proxies for 
stock acquirers are not significant (except for A_CFO which has a significant positive 
median) and thus do not support hypothesis 2a. Therefore, the findings do not support the 
view that stock bidders manage, in addition to accrual-based earnings, real-based ones. 
One reason for this could be that real activities manipulation is more costly than accrual 
manipulation and therefore would be less preferred by managers (Zang, 2012; Abernathy 
et al., 2014). 
The median values of A_CFO for the whole sample and for cash-paying acquirers are 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, which is not consistent with income-
increasing real account manipulation. However, the negative mean and median estimates 
for the abnormal discretionary expenses of -0.091 and -0.106 respectively (both 
significant at the 1% level) for cash bidders indicate that they reduce these expenses 
substantially. This significant reduction in discretionary expenditures increases cash 
flows from operations and hence may lead to positive estimates of A_CFO.  
((Table 5)) 
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When comparing stock bidders to cash bidders, we find that stock acquirers have 
significantly lower income-increasing manipulation through A_DISX than the cash 
acquirers for both the mean and median (cash acquirers have more negative abnormal 
discretionary expenses) and this is statistically significant at the 1% level. The 
statistically significant mean difference for A_PROD of -0.051 between stock and cash 
bids also indicate that stock bidders engage less in real-based earnings management 
activities through overproduction than cash bidders (cash acquirers have more positive 
abnormal production). Therefore, we do not find support for hypothesis 2b.  
The lack of support for this hypothesis could be associated with the costs and constraints 
faced by firms in using real-based earnings management.  Lower industry market share, 
poorer financial condition and higher tax rates are important constraints in managing 
earnings through real-based activities (Zang, 2012; Abernathy et al,. 2014).  
4.3 Accrual-based earnings management prior to merger announcements:  Pre- versus 
Post-Higgs  
The Higgs Report (2003) plays a major role in improving corporate governance through, 
among other things, calling for greater representation of outside directors on UK 
corporate boards. Table 6 presents the acquirers’ mean and median current and total 
abnormal accruals pre- and post-Higgs after separating the sample into stock and cash 
acquirers. The mean (median) current and total abnormal accruals for stock bidders in the 
pre-Higgs period show statistically significant positive estimates of 0.022 (0.031) and 
0.023 (0.029) respectively. However, the results for the difference in the mean and 
median figures for abnormal current accruals between pre- and post-Higgs groups are not 
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statistically significant and do not support hypothesis 3a. Therefore, it does not appear 
that stock acquirers have reduced accrual manipulation following the enactment of the 
Higgs recommendations. This could be due to the fact that when managers find that 
certain earnings management strategies  (real-based ones)  are more costly and 
constrained than the others, they will concentrate on other earnings management 
strategies (such as accrual-based ones) with less constraints and costs (Zang, 2012). This 
is feasible, especially given the low litigation risk in the UK compared to other countries, 
such as the US (Seetharaman et al., 2002). Therefore, it appears that the 
recommendations set out in the Higgs Report have not mitigated accrual earnings 
management.  
((Table 6)) 
The analysis of the cash acquirers subsample for the current and total abnormal accrual 
fails to yield any statistical significant results either for the pre-Higgs or for the post-
Higgs sample.  
In comparing the difference between stock and cash bidders in the pre-Higgs and post-
Higgs periods, we find that stock bidders have statistically significant higher income-
increasing accruals only in the pre-Higgs period. Specifically, the median difference for 
A_CA (A_TA) is 0.033 (0.036), significant at the 10% (5%) level. This partially supports 
hypothesis 3b. 
To sum up, this analysis indicates that the overall level of accrual-based earnings 
management activities for stock acquirers is not significantly lower in the post-Higgs era. 
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These findings are not consistent with findings in other contexts such as Cohen et al. 
(2008) and Ibrahim et al. (2011) who find a decrease in the accrual-based earnings 
manipulation after the passage of SOX in 2002 and with Chen et al. (2007) who also find 
a greater reduction in earnings management after the enactment of the Corporate 
Governance Best-Practice Principles (CGBPP) in Taiwan. However, when comparing 
stock and cash bidders, there is evidence of higher manipulation using accruals before the 
enactment of the Higgs recommendations but not after.  
4.4 Real-based earnings management prior to merger announcements:  Pre- versus Post-
Higgs  
The effect of the enactment of the Higgs Report (2003) on real earnings management 
proxies is also tested to examine if there is any change in earnings manipulation between 
the two periods. As shown in Table 7, the mean and median A_CFO, A_DISX, and 
A_PROD for stock bidders in the pre- and post-Higgs periods do not reveal significant 
figures. Moreover, the mean and median differences between the two periods do not 
exhibit statistically significant results; therefore, there is no support for hypothesis 4a. 
((Table 7)) 
Results in Table 7 also provide some evidence of a difference in income-increasing 
manipulation through real accounts for cash bidders between pre- and post-Higgs periods. 
The mean (median) estimates of A_DISX for cash bidders are -0.165 (-0.142) in the post-
Higgs period as compared to -0.061 (-0.086) in the pre-Higgs period.  
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When comparing stock vs. cash bidders in both periods, we find significant differences in 
A_DISX both before and after the enactment of Higgs [mean (median) differences are 
0.114 (0.059) before Higgs and 0.212 (0.156) after Higgs, significant at 10% level or 
below]. Therefore, there is no support for hypothesis 4b.  
Therefore, unlike US evidence of a shift to real earnings manipulation after the passage of 
SOX 2002, UK cash bidders engage in real-based earnings management activities 
through reducing discretionary expenses before the enactment of Higgs Report and 
enhance them in the post-Higgs era. This insignificant evidence of substituting accrual-
based with real-based earnings management activities could be due to the higher costs 
and constraints for real-based manipulation as compared to engaging in accrual-based 
activities (Zang, 2012). 
4.5 Multivariate Analysis  
In order to further examine the use of accrual and real manipulation in acquisitions that 
are financed by stock compared to those financed by cash, we provide multivariate results 
while controlling for variables related to the acquirer itself as well as variables related to 
the bid. The following logistic regressions are used:4 


  

yearINDOWNMTBVaLEVaSIZEa
INDRPREMPRODADISXAaCFOAaTAACAAaaSTK
tj10987
6543210 ___)_(_
(1) 
                                                          
4 Firm and year subscripts are not included for ease of presentation. 
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

  



yearINDOWN
MTBVaLEVaSIZEaINDRPREMHIGGSPOSTPRODA
HIGGSPOSTDISXAHIGGSPOSTCFOAHIGGSPOSTTAACAA
HIGGSPOSTPRODADISXAaCFOAaTAACAAaaSTK
tj15
14131211109
876
543210
*_
*_*_*)_(_
___)_(_
(2) 
Where:  
STK is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the acquisition was financed by 
stock and 0 if financed by cash; 
POST_HIGGS is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the acquisition was in the 
post-Higgs time period and 0 otherwise; 
PREM is the percentage premium paid by the acquirer with respect to the target’s 
share price four weeks prior to the announcement date as provided by Thomson One 
Banker; 
INDR is a dummy variable for industry relatedness of the merging firms which takes 
the value of 1 if the acquirer and target have the same 2-digit SIC Codes. 
SIZE is the size of the acquirer as measured by the log of its total assets, from 
Datastream; 
LEV is leverage as measured by the acquirer’s total debt divided by total asset, both 
from Datastream; 
MTBV is the market-to-book value of the acquirer defined as the market value of the 
common equity divided by the book value of the common equity the year before the 
merger announcement, both from Datastream; 
OWN is the total percentage of shares held by outsiders holding 5% or more of total 
shares, from company’s annual report; 
All other variables are as previously defined. 
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We include all accrual and real manipulation variables in the regression to test the 
significance of each. Therefore, our coefficients of interest are 1-4 in regression (1). To 
test for any differences across the periods before and after Higgs, we add interaction 
variables in regression (2) and therefore our coefficients of interest are 1-4 as well as 
6-9. We do not include both A_CA and A_TA in the same regression as they are highly 
correlated and both represent accrual manipulation; but we run regressions using each 
separately. We include as control variables the four-week premium since prior research 
shows a significant relationship between the payment method and the payment of 
premium (Antoniou et al., 2008). We also include the industry-relatedness of the acquirer 
and target since empirical evidence suggests that there is a difference in the impact of the 
bid on shareholder wealth for acquirers who engage in related acquisitions as compared 
to those in unrelated transactions (Matsusaka, 1993; Archbold, 2000; Walker, 2000). We 
also include the size of the acquirer and the leverage since these variables can affect the 
performance of the acquirer firm (Dickerson et al., 1997). We include the market-to-book 
value of the acquirer to control for the growth prospects especially that that the empirical 
evidence report that value firms (low MTBV) experience larger gains than glamour ones 
(high MTBV) (Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003) and cash acquirers are less overvalued 
than stock ones (Dong et al., 2006). We also include OWN, which controls for 
governance characteristics. Higher outside ownership of shares may indicate more 
scrutiny and lower opportunities of manipulation. This variable has been previously used 
to control for the governance structure in the earnings management context (e.g. 
Kasipillai and Mahenthiran, 2013).  Finally, we include year and industry dummies. The 
results are presented in table 8. 
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 ((Table 8)) 
Panel A presents results of the regressions using A_CA as the accrual manipulation 
variable. Unlike the univariate results, there is no evidence that stock-financed bids have 
a higher prevalence of accrual manipulation than cash-financed bids in the full sample 
(coefficient of A_CA is not significant). However, the results in the first column indicate 
that bids that are financed by cash have significantly less abnormal discretionary 
expenses (coefficient = 5.961; significant at the 5% level). This finding corroborates the 
result using mean differences for A_DISX. Therefore, cash bidders appear to reduce their 
discretionary expenses in preparation for an acquisition which would indicate income-
increasing manipulation.  
The results including the POST-HIGGS indicator variable as well as the interaction terms 
reveals some significant differences between the pre- and post-Higgs periods. 
Specifically, the coefficient for A_DISX and A_PROD are both positive and significant 
(coefficient = 12.5 and 11.5 for A_DISX and A_PROD, respectively, both significant at 
the 5% level). Whereas A_CFO and A_PROD are significantly lower across the post-
Higgs period (coefficient = -21.7 and -19.2 for A_CFO*POST-HIGGS and 
A_PROD*POST_HIGGS, respectively, both significant at the 5% level). Therefore, we 
find that cash-bidders have more manipulation pre-Higgs using discretionary expenses as 
compared to stock bidders, and this difference is reduced in the post-Higgs period.   
Panel B presents results using A_TA as the accrual manipulation measure. The results are 
slightly different from panel A. There is evidence that stock bidders engage in more 
income-increasing manipulation than cash bidders (coefficient of A_TA = 15.934; 
significant at the 5% level) in the full sample. However, there does not appear to be any 
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differences between pre- and post-Higgs periods as the coefficient for A_TA*POST-
HIGGS is insignificant in the final column. Furthermore, cash bidders engage in more 
income-increasing manipulation than stock bidders using real operating activities that 
reduce cash from operations and discretionary expenses (coefficient of A_CFO = 4.030; 
significant at the 5% level and coefficient of A_DISX = 8.896; significant at the 1% 
level). Across the two periods, cash bidders have higher income-increasing abnormal 
cash from operations in the pre-Higgs periods which is reversed in the post-Higgs period 
(coefficient of A_CFO = 17.555; significant at the 5% level and coefficient of 
A_CFO*POST-HIGGS = -34.583, significant at the 5% level). 
Overall, there is some evidence that in the full sample stock bidders engage in income-
increasing manipulation using accruals but not real activities. Furthermore, cash bidders 
engage in income-increasing manipulation using real activities (discretionary expenses) 
in the full sample. There are limited changes across the two periods before and after the 
Higgs enactment, which precludes a shift from accrual to real activities manipulation. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This study investigates accrual and real-based earnings management for a sample of 197 
UK acquiring firms from 12 different industries over the period 1990-2009. The findings 
of this study are somewhat consistent with those of Erickson and Wang (1999), Louis 
(2004), and Botsari and Meeks (2008) reporting evidence that stock-financed acquirers 
tend to report positive abnormal accruals prior to an M&A bid announcement. 
Furthermore, stock bidders engage in more positive accrual earnings management than 
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cash bidders since the latter lack the motivation to influence their share value before 
completing the bid.  
The recommendations set out in the Higgs Report in 2003 are meant to restrain firms 
from engaging in accrual earnings management activities (Iqbal and Strong, 2010); 
Habbash et al., 2013a; 2013b). However, we find no evidence of significant differences 
in accrual manipulation in stock bidders between the post-Higgs and the pre-Higgs 
periods.  
The results also reveal that cash bidders engage in real earnings manipulation through 
lower discretionary expenses, possibly in order to enhance cash availability for the bid. 
This study contributes to the literature by being the first to examine the incidence of pre-
merger real-based earnings management as well as accrual-based earnings management 
by UK acquirers.  It is also the first UK study to investigate earnings management 
behavior around changes to the corporate governance environment. The findings of this 
study are of potential interest to policy makers, professionals, and academics especially in 
that the issue of earnings management in the UK is of great importance for these groups. 
This study gives these parties awareness about the engagement of UK acquirers in 
earnings management activities. 
As with all research, there are limitations. Firstly, this research focuses on a specific 
setting, mergers and acquisitions. Therefore, the findings may not be generalizable to 
other specific corporate events. In addition, a major focus of our empirical investigation 
is on the pre-merger accrual and real-based earnings management of UK acquiring firms 
around changes in the UK corporate governance regime, brought about by the Higgs 
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Report (2003). Clearly the results associated with this strand of research might well not 
be applicable in other countries.  
This study investigates accrual and real-based earnings management for public acquiring 
firms that acquire public targets. Another avenue for further research is to investigate the 
same scenario of analysis when bidding firms acquire private targets especially since 
different levels of information asymmetry may exist. Researchers can also examine real-
based earnings management for other UK corporate events such as seasoned equity 
offerings (SEOs) and initial public offerings (IPOs). 
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Table 1: Sample Selection Procedures 
Description N 
Initial Sample: Public Acquirer/Target between 01/01/1990 to 31/12/2009 2,252 
EXCLUDE: 
   Acquirer/Target  from the Financial Sector 831 
Unsuccessful dealsa 256 
Deals whose method of payment are neither pure stock nor pure cash 492 
Share repurchasesb 297 
Reverse takeoversc 15 
Missing Datastream codes 28 
Unavailable accounting and share price data in Datastreamd 108 
Acquisition by same acquirer in adjacent years 28 
 
Final Sample 197 
 
a Unsuccessful bids include rumour, discontinued rumour and withdrawn deals 
b Deals in which both the acquirer and the target are the same 
c According to Thomson Financial (TF) deal definitions, a reverse takeover indicates a merger in which the acquiring 
company offers more than 50% of its equity as consideration offered to the target company resulting in the target 
company becoming the majority owner of the new company. These deals are excluded because they could 
confound the results. 
d In addition to the unavailable data, few observations for some control variables are deleted to mitigate the effects of 
outliers. The mean plus/minus 3 Standard deviation rule is used to check the distribution of these variables and 
exclude extreme values. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 47 
 
Table 2: Distribution of Sample Acquirers by Year and Industry 
Panel A: Distribution of sample acquirers by year 
Year Stock Bids Cash Bids All Bids 
 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
1990 1 1.33 5 4.10 6 3.05 
1991 3 4.00 9 7.38 12 6.09 
1992 1 1.33 9 7.38 10 5.08 
1993 1 1.33 5 4.10 6 3.05 
1994 3 4.00 7 5.74 10 5.08 
1995 1 1.33 11 9.02 12 6.09 
1996 4 5.33 6 4.92 10 5.08 
1997 4 5.33 9 7.38 13 6.60 
1998 5 6.67 7 5.74 12 6.09 
1999 10 13.33 6 4.92 16 8.12 
2000 3 4.00 7 5.74 10 5.08 
2001 4 5.33 5 4.10 9 4.57 
2002 2 2.67 3 2.46 5 2.54 
2003 7 9.33 3 2.46 10 5.08 
2004 4 5.33 3 2.46 7 3.55 
2005 5 6.67 8 6.56 13 6.60 
2006 3 4.00 6 4.92 9 4.57 
2007 4 5.33 5 4.10 9 4.57 
2008 3 4.00 2 1.64 5 2.54 
2009 7 9.33 6 4.92 13 6.60 
Total 75 100% 122 100% 197 100% 
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Panel B: Distribution of sample acquirers by industry 
Industry Stock Bids Cash Bids All Bids 
 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Consumer Non-durables 5 6.67 2 1.64 7 3.55 
Consumer durables 3 4.00 6 4.92 9 4.57 
Manufacturing 8 10.67 15 12.30 23 11.68 
Energy 3 4.00 1 0.82 4 2.03 
Chemicals 1 1.33 3 2.46 4 2.03 
Business Equipment 7 9.33 10 8.20 17 8.63 
Telecommunications 2 2.67 7 5.74 9 4.57 
Utilities 2 2.67 5 4.10 7 3.55 
Wholesale and Retail 6 8.00 10 8.20 16 8.12 
Healthcare 12 16.00 7 5.74 19 9.64 
Finance 3 4.00 7 5.74 10 5.08 
Other  23 30.67 49 40.16 72 36.55 
Total 75 1 122 1 197 1 
Industries are based on Fama French 12 classification. 
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Table 3: Pearson Correlation Coefficients (p-values) between Accrual-based and Real-based 
Earnings Management Proxies 
 
A_CA = Discretionary current accruals measured using Modified Jones Model with Kothari et al. (2005) modifications, 
A_TA = Discretionary total accruals measured using Modified Jones Model with Kothari et al. (2005) modifications, 
A_CFO = Abnormal Cash Flow from Operations, 
A_DISX = Abnormal Discretionary Expenses,  
A_PROD = Abnormal Production Costs. 
  
  A_TA A_CFO A_DISX A_PROD 
A_CA 0.893 -0.521 -0.166 0.067 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.036) (0.376) 
A_TA  -0.596 -0.115 -0.028 
   (0.000) (0.149) (0.715) 
A_CFO   0.069 -0.146 
    (0.388) (0.051) 
A_DISX    -0.340 
        (0.000) 
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Table 4: Accrual-based Earnings Management Proxies Derived from the Cross-Sectional Modified-
Jones Model based on the Cash Flow (CF) Approach 
This table presents accrual-based earnings management measures for the acquirers in the year prior to the deal’s 
announcement date. The results are based on parametric (t-tests for the means) and non-parametric (Wilcoxon signed-
ranks test for the medians) tests. P-values are given in parentheses and significant results are marked in bold. ***, **, * 
denote one-tailed significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
        
Difference 
  
All Bids Stock Bids Cash Bids Stock - Cash 
    Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
A_CA 
 
0.019** 0.018** 0.031* 0.039*** 0.012 0.000 0.019 0.039** 
P-Value 
 
(0.046) (0.043) (0.061) (0.008) (0.193) (0.366) (0.210) (0.038) 
No. of Obs. 197 75 122 
  
          A_TA 
 
0.005 -0.003 0.014 0.024* 0.000 -0.007 0.014 0.031** 
P-Value 
 
(0.274) (0.458) (0.182) (0.068) (0.489) (0.112) (0.237) (0.046) 
No. of Obs. 193 73 120     
A_CA = Discretionary current accruals measured using Modified Jones Model with Kothari et al. (2005) modifications, 
A_TA = Discretionary total accruals measured using Modified Jones Model with Kothari et al. (2005) modifications.  
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Table 5: Real-based Earnings Management Proxies 
The following table presents real-based earnings management measures for the acquirers in the year prior 
to the deal’s announcement date. The results are based on parametric (t-tests for the means) and non-
parametric (Wilcoxon signed-ranks test for the medians) tests.  P-values are given in parentheses and 
significant results are marked in bold. ***, **, * denote one-tailed significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level 
respectively. 
        
Difference 
  
All Bids Stock Bids Cash Bids Stock - Cash 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
A_CFO  0.011 0.015*** 0.015 0.003* 0.008 0.016*** 0.006 -0.013 
P-Value  (0.284) (0.002) (0.223) (0.084) (0.384) (0.001) (0.426) (0.156) 
No. of Obs.  197 75 122   
          
A_DISX  -0.039** -0.058*** 0.051 -0.022 -0.091*** -0.106*** 0.142*** 0.084*** 
P-Value  (0.027) (0.001) (0.103) (0.153) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
No. of Obs.  160 59 101   
          
A_PROD  0.013 0.025** -0.020 0.011 0.031** 0.030** -0.051* -0.019 
P-Value  (0.194) (0.042) (0.243) (0.233) (0.045) (0.022) (0.068) (0.139) 
No. of Obs.   179 61 118     
A_CFO = Abnormal Cash Flow from Operations, 
A_DISX = Abnormal Discretionary Expenses,  
A_PROD = Abnormal Production Costs. 
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Table 6: Accrual-based Earnings Management Proxies derived from the Cross-Sectional Modified-Jones Model based on the Cash Flow (CF) Approach 
for the Pre- and Post-Higgs Bids with the Method of Payment 
This table presents accrual-based earnings management measures for the acquirers in the year prior to the deal’s announcement date. The results are 
based on parametric (t-tests for the means) and non-parametric (Wilcoxon signed-ranks test for the medians) tests. P-values are given in parentheses and 
significant results are marked in bold. **, * denote one-tailed significance at 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 
Stock Bids Cash Bids Difference between Stock and Cash bids 
 
Pre-Higgs Bids Post-Higgs Bids Difference Pre-Post  Pre-Higgs Bids Post-Higgs Bids Pre-Higgs Bids Post-Higgs Bids 
 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
A_CA 0.022
* 0.031** 0.043 0.063* -0.022 -0.032 0.010 -0.003 0.017 0.021 0.012 0.033* 0.026 0.042 
P-Value (0.095) (0.041) (0.148) (0.097) (0.297) (0.197) (0.288) (0.485) (0.183) (0.228) (0.306) (0.071) (0.283) (0.200) 
No. of 
Obs. 
42  33    89  33       
       
  
   
  
   
A_TA 0.023
** 0.029** 0.002 0.024 0.021 0.005 0.000 -0.007 0.001 -0.007 0.023 0.036** 0.001 0.030 
P-Value (0.049) (0.045) (0.473) (0.442) (0.264) (0.266) (0.498) (0.123) (0.481) (0.354) (0.120) (0.017) (0.487) (0.487) 
No. of 
Obs. 
41   32       87   33           
A_CA = Discretionary current accruals measured using Modified Jones Model with Kothari et al. (2005) modifications, 
A_TA = Discretionary total accruals measured using Modified Jones Model with Kothari et al. (2005) modifications. 
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Table 7: Real-based Earnings Management Proxies for the Pre- and Post-Higgs Bids with the Method of Payment 
The following table presents real-based earnings management measures for the acquirers in the year prior to the deal’s announcement date. The results are based 
on parametric (t-tests for the means) and non-parametric (Wilcoxon signed-ranks test for the medians) tests. P-values are given in parentheses and significant 
results are marked in bold. ***, **, * denote one-tailed significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 
  Stock Bids Cash Bids Difference between Stock and Cash bids 
 
Pre-Higgs Bids Post-Higgs Bids Difference Pre-Post Pre-Higgs Bids Post-Higgs Bids Pre-Higgs Bids Post-Higgs Bids 
 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
A_CFO 0.004 -0.015 0.029 0.017 -0.024 -0.032 -0.021 0.009
** 0.087*** 0.065*** 0.025 -0.024 -0.058 -0.048 
P-Value (0.402) (0.464) (0.234) (0.128) (0.285) (0.126) (0.291) (0.023) (0.002) (0.002) (0.272) (0.142) (0.115) (0.170) 
No. of 
Obs. 
42  33    89  33       
 
      
  
   
  
   
A_DISX 0.053 -0.027 0.048 0.014 0.005 -0.041 -0.061
*** -0.086*** -0.165*** -0.142*** 0.114** 0.059** 0.212** 0.156*** 
P-Value (0.132) (0.476) (0.260) (0.288) (0.477) (0.414) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.014) (0.037) (0.010) (0.004) 
No. of 
Obs. 
36  23    72  29       
       
  
   
  
   
A_PROD -0.002 0.002 -0.049 0.018 0.047 -0.016 0.025 0.017 0.049 0.075 -0.026 -0.015 -0.097
* -0.057 
P-Value (0.473) (0.348) (0.214) (0.445) (0.243) (0.462) (0.109) (0.088) (0.121) (0.062) (0.220) (0.265) (0.094) (0.171) 
No. of 
Obs. 
37   24       87   31           
A_CFO = Abnormal Cash Flow from Operations, 
A_DISX = Abnormal Discretionary Expenses,  
A_PROD = Abnormal Production Costs. 
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Table 8: Multivariate Analysis for Accrual and Real-based Earnings Management for the Pre- and Post-
Higgs Bids with the Method of Payment 
Panel A: Current Accruals and Real-based Earnings Management 
The following table presents coefficients and p-values from logistic regressions of the form: 


  

yearINDOWNMTBVaLEVaSIZEa
INDRPREMPRODADISXAaCFOAaCAAaaSTK
tj10987
6543210 ____  
 




  



yearINDOWN
MTBVaLEVaSIZEaINDRPREMHIGGSPOSTPRODA
HIGGSPOSTDISXAHIGGSPOSTCFOAHIGGSPOSTTAACAA
HIGGSPOSTPRODADISXAaCFOAaCAAaaSTK
tj15
14131211109
876
543210
*_
*_*_*)_(_
____
 
 
Variable Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Intercept 6.342* 0.068 16.481** 0.014 
A_CA 3.231 0.207 -3.135 0.375 
A_CFO 1.367 0.185 3.248 0.214 
A_DISX 5.961** 0.016 12.510* 0.050 
A_PROD -2.115 0.229 11.545* 0.085 
POST-HIGGS   -6.753 0.127 
A_CA*POST-HIGGS   16.341 0.101 
A_CFO*POST-HIGGS   -21.665** 0.013 
A_DISX*POST-HIGGS   1.732 0.420 
A_PROD*POST-HIGGS   -19.154** 0.038 
PREM -0.006 0.347 -0.063** 0.026 
INDR 0.301 0.375 2.248* 0.087 
SIZE -0.857* 0.097 -1.057 0.104 
LEV -4.582 0.118 -7.192 0.101 
MTBV -0.087 0.201 -0.296** 0.043 
OWN -0.027 0.135 0.020 0.340 
Industry Dummies YES YES 
Year Dummies YES YES 
     
N 107 107 
Likelihood ratio 68.236 84.957 
 P-value 0.003 0.001 
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Panel B: Total Accruals and Real-based Earnings Management 
The following table presents coefficients and p-values from logistic regressions of the form: 


  

yearINDOWNMTBVaLEVaSIZEa
INDRPREMPRODADISXAaCFOAaTAAaaSTK
tj10987
6543210 ____  
 




  



yearINDOWN
MTBVaLEVaSIZEaINDRPREMHIGGSPOSTPRODA
HIGGSPOSTDISXAHIGGSPOSTCFOAHIGGSPOSTTAACAA
HIGGSPOSTPRODADISXAaCFOAaTAAaaSTK
tj15
14131211109
876
543210
*_
*_*_*)_(_
____
 
 
Variable Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Intercept 8.110** 0.037 24.689** 0.047 
A_TA 15.934** 0.012 60.908** 0.027 
A_CFO 4.030** 0.018 17.555** 0.026 
A_DISX 8.896*** 0.006 23.302 0.101 
A_PROD -1.058 0.370 10.866 0.195 
POST-HIGGS   -2.957 0.405 
A_TA*POST-HIGGS   -26.768 0.117 
A_CFO*POST-HIGGS   -34.583** 0.014 
A_DISX*POST-HIGGS   0.461 0.487 
A_PROD*POST-HIGGS   -28.114** 0.039 
PREM -0.003 0.429 -0.074** 0.036 
INDR 0.650 0.265 5.841** 0.045 
SIZE -1.186** 0.049 -2.943** 0.038 
LEV -5.056 0.112 -3.202 0.327 
MTBV -0.169* 0.072 -0.637** 0.023 
OWN -0.040* 0.065 -0.073 0.119 
Industry Dummies YES YES 
Year Dummies YES YES 
     
N 107 107 
Likelihood ratio 74.377 94.826 
 P-value 0.001 0.001 
A_CA = Discretionary current accruals measured using Modified Jones Model with Kothari et al. (2005) modifications, 
A_TA = Discretionary total accruals measured using Modified Jones Model with Kothari et al. (2005) modifications, 
A_CFO = Abnormal Cash Flow from Operations, 
A_DISX = Abnormal Discretionary Expenses,  
A_PROD = Abnormal Production Costs, 
 56 
 
STK = Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the acquisition was financed by stock and 0 if financed by cash, 
PREM = Percentage premium paid by the acquirer with respect to the target’s share price four weeks prior to the 
announcement date as provided by Thomson One Banker; 
INDR = Dummy variable for industry relatedness of the merging firms which takes the value of 1 if the acquirer and target 
have the same 2-digit SIC Codes 
 SIZE = Size of the acquirer as measured by the log of its total assets, from Datastream; 
LEV = Leverage as measured by the acquirer’s total debt divided by total asset, both from Datastream; 
MTBV = Market-to-book value of the acquirer defined as the market value of the common equity divided by the book value 
of the common equity the year before the merger announcement, both from Datastream; 
OWN = Total percentage of shares held by outsiders holding 5% or more of total shares, from company’s annual report. 
Significant results for coefficients of accrual and real-based measures are marked in bold.  
***, **, * denote one-tailed significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 
 
 
 
